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Even bad coffee is better than no coffee at all.
—David Lynch
onstitutivists about norms in metaethics explain the normative 
standards in a domain by appealing to constitutive features of the mem-
bers of the domain.1 So, for example, Korsgaard seeks to explain what it 
is to be a good person by appeal to what it is to be a person. This is an appealing 
explanatory strategy because, if successful, it offers a general and comprehensive 
account of how different normative standards govern distinct normative domains. 
It could, e.g., explain how moral normative standards govern agents, practical 
normative standards govern purposive behavior, epistemic normative standards 
govern beliefs and inferences, artifactual normative standards govern artifacts, 
and biological normative standards govern organs and biological processes.2
1 Constitutivism is often presented, as with Enoch, as “a family of views that hope to ground 
normativity in norms, or standards, or motives, or aims that are constitutive of action and 
agency” (“Shmagency Revisited,” 208). Or, by Tiffany, as “the view that it is possible to 
derive contentful, normatively binding demands of practical reason and morality from the 
constitutive features of agency” (“Why Be an Agent?” 223). I prefer a more ecumenical 
characterization in which the norms need not be those of practical reason and they need 
not be grounded in what is constitutive of action or agency, but rather can be grounded 
in any constitutive feature of the individual governed by the norms. An argument for this 
preference is beyond the scope of this paper, but this view is implicitly presupposed by the 
targets of my arguments. An even more inclusive characterization is defended by Michael 
Smith (in “A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons”), who characterizes any account that reduc-
es a normative feature to a constitutive feature of some other thing.
2 Constitutivism is often contrasted with constructivism and realism. To understand these 
contrasts, it is important to specify the domain about which one is a constitutivist, realist, 
or constructivist. It is possible to be a constitutivist about one domain and an error theorist 
about another, for example, though it is not possible to be an error theorist and constitu-
tivist about the same domain. I discuss constitutivism about norms. For a useful discussion 
of the relationship between constructivism and constitutivism, see Schafer, “Realism and 
Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1).”
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A central challenge for normative constitutivism is to account for the con-
nection between an individual’s constitutive nature and its normative standards. 
Critics worry that this kind of explanation is impossible.3 One prominent objec-
tion to constitutivism is the worry that normative standards governing an indi-
vidual cannot be grounded in its kind in the way constitutivists claim without 
ruling out the possibility that kind-members could violate those standards. This 
objection is sometimes called the Problem of Bad Action.4
The main lesson of this paper is that current constitutivist accounts face a 
serious threat, though not from the well-known Problem of Bad Action. Rather, 
the way in which they take norms to constitute norm-governed kinds commits 
them to what I call the Threshold Commitment. This, I argue, leads to serious 
costs for constitutivists that should lead them to reject this commitment and 
seek another explanation of this connection.
1. Violability and Naïve Constitutivism
One naïve constitutivist explanation of norms is that the norms themselves are 
constitutive of individuals in virtue of being satisfied. This account generates 
norms that are unable to account for what I call Violability.
Violability: That a norm applies to x and requires p does not logically or 
metaphysically imply that x satisfies p.
Problematically, such explanations cannot be used to account for the obvious 
fact that there are better and worse things in the world. Railton raises a concern 
of this form when he worries how we could, e.g., determine whether someone 
who fails to aim at truth in forming beliefs is defective. He writes that “to dis-
3 In this paper, I focus on the criticism that the constitutive connection between norms and 
kinds causes insurmountable problems for constitutivists. Recently another criticism has 
become increasingly popular against constitutivism. David Enoch (see “Agency, Shmagen-
cy” and “Shmagency Revisited”) and Kieran Setiya (see “Explaining Action” and Reasons 
without Rationalism) worry that the constitutive starting point is either too anemic to pro-
vide a full accounting of the normative landscape or too robust to be normatively uncontro-
versial. This objection is orthogonal to the problem I discuss in this piece, but I discuss it in 
“An Explanation of Constitutivist Normativity.” For helpful discussions of the issues remain-
ing for constitutivists in light of these objections, see Rosati, “Agents and ‘Shmagents’”; and 
Silverstein, “The Shmagency Question.”
4 The problem of bad action is so called because it has been raised in response to constitutive 
accounts of practical norms. However, because the problem is supposed to arise from the 
form of constitutive explanation, not the nature of the practical domain, there will be analo-
gous problems for all normative domains. The problem is, therefore, more general than the 
name lets on.
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cover that the metal in the sample tray on one’s laboratory bench has atomic 
number 82 is not to discover that it is ‘defective gold,’ but rather that it is not 
gold at all. A similar problem confronts all constitutive arguments.”5 Clark raises 
similar worries specific to Velleman: if any action must have the aim of autono-
my, but autonomy is a precondition of action, all action necessarily achieves its 
aim. If constitutive accounts are the only explanation of the normative features 
of action (including reasons for action), any action that achieves its aim should, 
it seems, have no reasons that speak against it, making it incapable of being ra-
tionally criticized.6
Railton and Clark both highlight specific instances of a more general concern 
about the role this naïve account gives to standards: if what it is to be a member 
of a norm-governed kind is to meet a certain standard, then that standard seems 
incapable of simultaneously serving as a way to differentiate good kind-members 
from bad kind-members. The naïve view then is a nonstarter for constitutivists 
for exactly the reason Railton and Clark highlight. Any successful constitutivist 
explanation must provide a metaphysical account of the constitutive features 
of normatively evaluable kinds that is consistent with Violability. This account 
must show that there is some connection between the kind and the norms tight 
enough to account for the constitutive explanation, but weak enough to allow 
for defect and other evaluations according to norms.7
Constitutivists are clearly aware of the need for non-naïve constitutive ex-
planations. Velleman, for example, recognizes the importance of distinguishing 
between the conditions on aiming and actually achieving an aim. He writes that 
“If autonomy were the constitutive aim of action, then every instance of action . . . 
would turn out to be a success.”8 Korsgaard seems similarly interested in leaving 
room for norms to be constitutively understood while not satisfied. In the spe-
cific case of norms constitutive of action, she writes:
5 Railton, “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Ac-
tion,” 70.
6 Clark, “Velleman’s Autonomism,” 581–82. Clark quotes Velleman, The Possibility of Practical 
Reason, 185.
7 For worries of this nature by critics, see Railton, “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothet-
ical in Reasoning about Belief and Action”; Clark, “Velleman’s Autonomism”; Barandalla 
and Ridge, “Function and Self-Constitution”; Lavin, “Practical Reason and the Possibility 
of Error”; Silverstein, “Teleology and Normativity.” For worries acknowledged by consti-
tutivists, see the introduction in Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason; Korsgaard, 
Self-Constitution, especially sec. 8.1; and Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics, 
61–63.
8 Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, 30n37. Further discussion of Velleman’s view 
can be found in section 6 below.
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[If] it is the essential nature of [a kind] that it have a certain metaphysical 
property . . . but in order to have that metaphysical property it must have 
a certain normative property . . . then this explains why the [individual] 
must meet the normative standard: it just isn’t [a member of the kind] if it 
doesn’t. But it also seems as if it explains it rather too well, for it seems to 
imply that only good [individuals] really [are kind-members], and that 
there is nothing left for bad [kind-members] to be.9
There are less naïve explanations of how normative standards are related to the 
constitutive features of kind-members that preserve Violability. Constitutivists 
might, for instance, take normative satisfaction to be a scalar matter, and claim 
that some degree of normative satisfaction is constitutive. So long as the meta-
physical property can be realized by a number of normative properties, or by 
having some normative property to some degree, this connection need not rule 
out Violability. So, constitutivist accounts that permit scalar norm satisfaction 
as a criterion of kind-membership would be perfectly compatible with violat-
ed norms and defective kind-members. Indeed, such views seem to be held by 
many constitutivists. Korsgaard and Velleman, for example, hold that constitut-
ing oneself and aiming at agency are activities that agents can do in better and 
worse ways. Neither account for the relationship between individuals and kinds 
on the naïve model that would make them natural targets for Railton’s objection.
So, for example, Korsgaard, in Self-Constitution, explains the constitutive fea-
ture uniting kinds as a matter of having an internal teleological organization or 
form, which is a matter of minimally satisfying some constitutive standards or 
norms. Though you must be in the practice of constituting yourself to be eval-
uated according to the constituting-oneself standards (i.e., practical norms), 
there are better and worse ways of doing this, and so better and worse agents.10 
The norms of self-constitution are, therefore, scalar; there are ways of violating 
the norms and still being an agent, because you are still constituting yourself, 
just doing so badly.11 Velleman introduces similar teleological features in his 
account by making it a criterial feature of agency that one constitutively aim 
at self-knowledge, where that aiming can be done more or less successfully.12 
Katsafanas has recently defended a Nietzschian constitutivist account of agency 
9 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 160.
10 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, ch. 2.
11 This point is nicely made by Walden, “Laws of Nature, Laws of Freedom, and the Social 
Construction of Normativity.”
12 Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason and “Replies to Discussion on The Possibility of 
Practical Reason.”
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in which the constitutive aims of action are coherence and the will to power. On 
this view, one can be more or less coherent and thus be a better or worse agent.13 
Michael Smith has developed his account of idealized agency into a constitutiv-
ist explanation of practical normativity that seems best accounted for on a scalar 
model. On his view, for example, it is constitutive of the ideally rational agent 
that they have the desire to help and not harm, but in order to be an agent—and 
thereby be governed by the norms that the ideally rational agent necessarily sat-
isfies—individual agents need not fully have these desires.14
Of course, there are worries about these scalar accounts and whether they can 
provide genuine normative assessments or standards. Clark, for example, con-
siders a variant of Velleman’s view on which some amount of autonomy, short 
of perfect autonomy, is required for action. Clark worries that this move would 
not fully account for the standard normative assessment for actions because the 
goal of autonomy up to a threshold cannot serve as a standard of assessment 
for action. Setiya objects that the constitutive normative requirements on these 
accounts do not provide sufficient material to fully account for practical norms 
or their scope.15 Though the scalar accounts do not yet amount to responses to 
these worries, they do make progress over the naïve constitutivist account that 
falls to Violability concerns. Here, I want to focus on a problem arising precisely 
from the feature of scalar accounts that allows them to satisfy Violability.
2. Threshold Constitutivism
Such constitutivists make room for defective kind-members by identifying the 
metaphysical property essential for kind-hood with some minimal threshold 
of normative properties, rather than a single bivalent normative property. So, 
e.g., minimal conformity to the norms of action, rather than perfect conformity, 
is constitutive of action. This is progress over the naïve constitutivist account, 
which risks identifying the perfect with the real. However, by giving minimal 
norm-satisfaction a criterial role, they maintain an identification of the real with 
the minimally good. Such views are unsatisfactory because they involve an im-
plicit endorsement of what I call the Threshold Commitment:
Threshold Commitment: For norm-governed kinds, an individual must at 
13 Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics.
14 Smith, “A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons.”
15 See Clark, “Velleman’s Autonomism”; Setiya, “Explaining Action,” 371–76, and “Akrasia and 
the Constitution of Agency.”
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least partially satisfy the constitutive norms of a kind, or partially meet 
the constitutive aim of a kind, in order to be a member of that kind.16
In other words, norm-governed kinds are those that have kind-membership 
conditions constituted by minimally having the normative properties that are 
good-making for that kind. This is supposed to explain why individual kind-mem-
bers must meet normative standards in a way that does not, in Korsgaard’s words, 
explain it a little too well. Normative violators risk nonexistence, though there 
are many ways of falling short before you cease being a kind-member.17 So, the 
Threshold Commitment is another commitment to normative satisfaction itself 
being a constitutive condition on kind-hood, albeit one that permits satisfying 
those norms to a greater degree with being better qua kind-member.18
This commitment is widespread among constitutivists.19 Korsgaard, in intro-
ducing constitutive standards in the introduction to The Constitution of Agency 
writes:
Two things are important to notice about standards of this kind. First of 
all, constitutive standards are at once normative and descriptive. They are 
descriptive because an object must meet them, or at least aspire to meet 
them, in order to be what it is. And they are normative because an object 
16 Note that the Threshold Commitment does not simply claim that there are thresholds that 
determine kind-membership; it takes a stand on the nature of those thresholds: they are 
determined by normative properties. Importantly, the Threshold Commitment takes a 
normative difference and attributes to it a metaphysical significance. Nothing in this paper 
should be taken as an argument against the possibility of understanding important or inter-
esting relationships between normative failures and metaphysical status. Here I am simply 
highlighting a particular commitment that many constitutivists have to normative goodness 
itself being criterial or constitutive of kind-membership, and, correlatively, to there being 
criterial thresholds constituted by normative conditions.
17 It is not essential that there is a scalar norm that serves as the unique criterion for the 
Threshold Commitment. A similarly workable account might feature a number of binary 
criteria such that each would make a K-member better if it satisfied the criteria but any of 
which would be sufficient for making an individual x such a K-member.
18 On some readings of Korsgaard, this also leads to an identification of satisfying more 
K-norms with being more of a K-member and thus with being more evaluable by the con-
stitutive norms of the relevant kind. I think that this is unlikely to be the best version of a 
Korsgaard-style view, but it is possibly her actual view. For a defense of this interpretation of 
Korsgaard and an argument that this view faces a related worry, see Silverstein, “Teleology 
and Normativity.”
19 Matthew Silverstein has recently argued that endorsement of something like the Threshold 
Commitment is a problem for Korsgaard’s constitutive account. The problems he identifies 
differ from mine, and his criticisms are limited to Korsgaard, but we substantially agree on 
the cause of the problem. See Silverstein, “Teleology and Normativity.”
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to which they apply can fail to meet them, at least to some extent, and is 
subject to criticism if it does not. This double nature finds expression in 
the fact that we can criticize such objects by saying that they are poor ob-
jects of their kind (“That’s a poor encyclopedia, it isn’t up to date!”) or by 
saying that they are not such objects at all (“That’s not an encyclopedia: 
it’s just a compendium of nineteenth-century opinion!”).20
Korsgaard holds both that it is a good-making standard of encyclopedias that 
they are up to date, and that sufficiently out-of-date encyclopedias are not ency-
clopedias but rather mere compendia of the opinion of a time.
Other constitutivists make similarly clear commitments. Katsafanas writes:
There is a great deal of distance between the standards minimally consti-
tutive of househood and the standards of an excellent house. There is a 
great deal of distance between a plywood shack in the forest that will dis-
solve back into the environment in a few years, and a sturdy stone house 
that will last for centuries. Both of these count as houses, but it seems 
natural to say that the stone house is a better house. We might describe 
this by saying that the same standards apply to the stone house and the 
shack: the standards of househood. But there are better and worse ways 
of fulfilling these standards. At some point, a structure will have met the 
standards to a sufficient degree to qualify as a house, but will not have 
met the standards to a sufficient degree to qualify as an excellent house.21
Katsafanas, like Korsgaard, is committed to both the Threshold Commitment 
and a connection between norms and fundamental evaluative assessment. The 
normative properties of houses account for both the metaphysical difference be-
tween househood and non-househood, and the evaluative difference between 
merely adequate and excellent houses. These are the dual roles given to norma-
tive standards by those we might call “Threshold Constitutivists.”
As Korsgaard highlights, one appeal of the Threshold Commitment is its sup-
port for some (though, of course, not all) of our linguistic practices involving at-
tributing and denying kind-hood to objects of evaluation. Though we might not 
identify perfection and reality, sometimes we do talk as if we identify extreme 
defect and nonbeing. I suspect we are less likely to join Korsgaard in accusing 
out-of-date encyclopedias of being non-encyclopedias; however, we do seem to 
make claims like (pointing to the liquid in a mug), “This coffee is so bad, it’s not 
20 Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, 8.
21 Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics, 64.
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even coffee!”22 If meeting a minimum normative standard of coffee were a meta-
physical condition on being coffee, this could be a literally true claim about the 
metaphysical status of the liquid under discussion rather than a metaphorical 
expression of disapproval. Implausibly, being bad enough at being coffee could 
constitute (directly and literally) not being coffee. If so, Lynch is wrong about 
some bad coffee; sometimes having bad enough coffee just is having none at all.
Linguistic appeals aside, according to its proponents the main advantage of 
understanding threshold normative properties as metaphysically constitutive of 
kind-membership is the ability to explain the legitimate normativity of those 
properties and to answer skeptical challenges to their authority. Korsgaard 
writes that “the only way to establish the authority of any purported normative 
principle is to establish that it is constitutive of something to which the person 
whom it governs is committed—something that she either is doing or has to 
do.”23 According to Korsgaard, what should make you interested in building a 
good house is the risk that if you do not do it well enough, you will not end up 
with a house at all. This move requires something like a threshold; there is some 
existential (not merely pragmatic) risk of not satisfying kind-norms. In a similar 
spirit, Katsafanas writes that “a builder must aim at building a good house, if by 
‘good’ [we] mean a house that is at or above the cut-off point for househood.”24 The 
Threshold Commitment is not an ad hoc or ancillary feature of these constitu-
tivist views.25
3. The Cost of Reduced Explanatory Unity
Though Threshold Constitutivism makes progress over naïve constitutivism, 
it comes with serious costs. Normative Constitutivism has ambitions to be an 
explanatory strategy for norms in general. If there are norm-governed kinds 
without normative thresholds, then one cost to Threshold Constitutivists is de-
creased explanatory scope. Indeed, social kinds like Spouse appear to provide 
22 This was once said to me by Luca Ferrero, who, years later, refuses to retract the claim or 
accept it as a figure of speech. It was, indeed, very bad. I maintain it was still clearly coffee.
23 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 32.
24 This move worries those suspicious that constitutivism does not require us to care about 
norms as such, or goodness as such, but only some more minimal standards. For example, 
see Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency” and “Shmagency Revisited.” The objection I am develop-
ing here holds even if the Threshold Constitutivist can address Enoch’s worries.
25 Some constitutivists appeal less to Threshold-type claims. In section 6 below, I argue that 
versions of constitutive aim accounts do not obviously avoid the Threshold Commitment. 
In section 7, I sketch a possible constitutive account that I argue does avoid the Threshold 
Commitment and is worth further development.
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ready cases of kinds that lack normative thresholds.26 Given the importance of 
explanatory unity, this means that Threshold Constitutivism comes with a cost 
of reduced explanatory unity.
It is clearly possible for there to be better and worse spouses and for particu-
lar spouses to improve or become worse qua spouse. We then are committed to 
thinking that there are ways of being a better and worse spouse that are generally 
true of spouses that we track when we make these assessments. The norms of 
spouses are those standards that would, when satisfied, make a spouse better 
qua spouse, and these norms are the subject matter of constitutivist explanation. 
The constitutivist will want to find some constitutive feature of spouses that ex-
plains the norms according to which we assess individual spouses as better or 
worse.27 Spouse is, so understood, a goodness-fixing kind, the norms of which 
come from its constitutive nature.28
However, satisfying these norms to some minimal degree does not seem to 
be a constitutive requirement of being a spouse at all. One does not become a 
spouse by being a good enough one, and one cannot cease being a spouse merely 
in virtue of being a bad enough one. The metaphysical conditions on spouse-
hood seem to involve multiply realizable social recognition practices. Different 
social groups can determine different practices for the social recognition, but at 
least in contemporary practice, we take legal recognition to be at least partially 
determinant of becoming a spouse, and recognized removal of legal recognition 
to be a sufficient (and, along with the death of one’s spouse, exhaustive) condi-
tion on ceasing to be a spouse.
This is supported by how we view the recent changes in constitutional law in 
the United States. We recognize these changes to have permitted same-sex cou-
ples to become spouses. We do not tend to think that they were already spouses 
and that the law needed to be changed to recognize this fact.29 This indicates 
that we view legal recognition as a condition on having the social kind Spouse, 
26 Throughout, I use the singular, capitalized noun to pick out the kind, and lowercase uses to 
pick out instances in the singular or plural. So, here, I consider the kind Spouse, and later 
I discuss individual conditions on being a spouse and the norms that spouses are assessed 
according to.
27 Though it seems pretty clear to me that such an explanation is plausibly in the offing, noth-
ing here turns on there being such an explanation. All we need here is the conclusion that 
the Threshold Commitment will make this explanation impossible for the kind.
28 See, Thomson, Normativity, for discussion of goodness-fixing kinds and an argument sup-
porting this move from judgments of being better and worse qua K to K norms.
29 For example, none of the couples in Obergefell reported that they wanted to have the state 
recognize that they were already married; the fight for gay marriage was the fight to recog-
nize the significance of same-sex partnerships by permitting them to be marriages.
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rather than as conveying a distinct kind-status that one can gain in addition to 
the social kind. Though legal recognition is just one way that social groups could 
choose to determine spousal-recognition conditions, it seems that the way one 
gains the social kind Spouse here is by undergoing certain legally recognized and 
sanctioned events.30 
Just as someone does not need to be any good (or even intend to be good) 
according to the norms of spouses to become one, spouses also cannot lose their 
spouse-hood in virtue of becoming a bad enough spouse. Divorce and death: 
those are the ways to cease being a spouse. Divorce is just the term we have for 
the way in which two spouses dissolve a marriage through social recognition. It 
is this dissolution of the social recognition, itself multiply realizable, that consti-
tutes loss of kind-membership.31 Given the need for the retraction of social rec-
ognition (or possibly death), extreme defect would only be existentially risky for 
very bad spouses if extreme defect was retraction of social recognition. However, 
defect just is not the sort of thing that could be retraction of social recognition. 
Extreme spousal badness could be grounds for a marriage to be dissolved, but 
mistreatment or abandonment it is not itself a divorce. Even if we thought that 
having the intention to divorce your spouse were a way of being a bad spouse, 
the intention to divorce is insufficient (and given the possibility of dissolution of 
marriage by death, unnecessary) to cease being a spouse. The completed divorce, 
not the intention that begins it, dissolves a marriage.32
The role that normative thresholds supposedly play in providing reasons is 
also missing in the spousal case. Among all the reasons you might take yourself 
to have for being a good spouse, you would never consider that, in being a bad 
spouse, you might end up automatically divorced. We take spouses to have the 
right to determine, for themselves, just how bad a spouse they will tolerate. Sure-
ly, some people might have the Lynch coffee attitude toward spouses: having a 
30 Even in places where common-law spouses are possible, one does not become a spouse 
merely by acting as a spouse does; these cases are possible because one way of having social 
recognition in these places is by recognizing common-law marriages. If acting as a spouse 
were sufficient to be a spouse, independent of recognition by a larger social body, then many 
same-sex couples could have been accurately described as having their spousal status recog-
nized, rather than constituted, when they first legally married, but this is not what happened.
31 I am tempted to also say that death is a way to stop being a spouse independently of the 
dissolution of social recognition, but it seems that in some social groups one can still be a 
spouse when widowed. It might be that in social groups like ours in which death is a way to 
cease being a spouse, it is a socially recognized way of loss of kind-membership.
32 Even in cases like Catholic marriages in which the conditions for successful recognition in-
clude certain intentions, like to raise one’s children in the church, if it is later demonstrated 
that these conditions were not met, this does not dissolve the marriage. Such demonstra-
tions (i.e., annulments) establish that a marriage never occurred in the first place.
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very bad spouse might be better than none at all. It seems implausible that such 
people might end up in a position in which, despite the interests of both to main-
tain their (very bad) marriage, they find themselves not spouses.
We thus have a kind, Spouse, that is norm governed but whose norms do 
not constitute threshold conditions on kind-membership. In at least some cas-
es, then, individual persistence conditions do not seem metaphysically tied to 
normative conditions. Because of cases like this, Threshold Constitutivists are 
faced with a choice: narrow the scope of constitutivist explanation to exclude 
the norms of kinds like Spouses, or reject the Threshold Commitment.
The former option should not be taken lightly. One important standard of 
explanations is how well they unify the various phenomena to be explained and 
by how well their argumentative patterns can be used to explain a wide variety 
of phenomena.33 Thus, a constitutivist explanation that is able to explain the 
norms of Spouses is thereby better than one that is unable to do so. Moreover, 
given that one of the promises of constitutivism is its seeming ability to provide 
a general explanatory account of the norms of any norm-governed kind by ap-
peal to its constitutive features, constitutivists should be averse to any commit-
ment that restricts the project’s explanatory scope.
4. The Cost of Counterintuitive Persistence Conditions
Unlike social kinds like Spouses, physical artifacts make particularly striking 
examples of cases in which defect seems to lead pretty straightforwardly to 
destruction. It is not surprising then that they are often used to illustrate the 
Threshold Commitment. Houses are commonly used to illustrate the metaphys-
ical risk that defect poses. Korsgaard, for instance, uses a discussion of defective 
houses in one of her clearest discussions of the Threshold Commitment:
On this view, to be an object, and to be teleologically organized, are one 
and the same thing. Teleological organization is what unifies what would 
otherwise be a mere heap of matter into a particular object or particular 
kind. . . . At the same time, it is the teleological organization or form of the 
object that supports normative judgments about it. A house with cracks 
in the walls is less good at keeping the weather out, less good at shelter-
ing, and therefore a less good house. The ancient metaphysical thesis of 
the identification of the real with the good follows immediately from this 
conception, for this kind of badness eventually shades off into literal dis-
33 See, e.g., Friedman, “Explanation and Scientific Understanding”; Kitcher, “Explanatory 
Unification” and “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World.”
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integration. A house with enough cracks in the walls will crumble, and 
cease to be a house altogether: it will disintegrate back into a mere heap of 
boards and plaster and bricks.34
In endorsing what she calls the “ancient metaphysical thesis of the identifica-
tion of the real with the good,” Korsgaard identifies being a house with minimal 
house goodness. It is a particularly compelling example: it is certainly true that 
the house’s very existence is increasingly threatened by mounting normative fail-
ure. The case is supposed to provide a clear illustration of the Threshold Com-
mitment because in the case of artifacts loss of kind-membership (or “the real”) 
is a matter of physical destruction. Because badness is supposed to “shade into” 
physical destruction, being sufficiently bad is a way of becoming non-real, as the 
Threshold Commitment says.
However, this is a mistake. Though the house case is used to illustrate the 
Threshold Commitment, this illustration turns on misinterpreting a causal con-
nection as a constitutive one. A house with enough cracks in the walls is very 
likely to crumble, but it is the crumbling, rather than the badness, that shades 
into literal disintegration. Considering a case of a house at the brink of extreme 
defect can help us see why artifacts should not be used to support the Threshold 
Commitment.
The Very Bad House: A Very Bad House is vacant and has been left to the 
elements. By time t1, it is on the brink of physical collapse. Let us grant 
that there is some normative threshold for houses: there is at least one 
way of becoming so bad according to the norms of houses that any ad-
ditional normative failure would constitute loss of househood. The Very 
Bad House, by stipulation, sits on the house-side of the threshold at t1. If 
the house were to become any worse, it would pass over the normative 
threshold and the resulting arrangement of bricks and shingles would not 
be a house or would be a “house” in name only.
At t2 two things happen. First, the Very Bad House fails according to 
yet another house norm (or norms), which constitutes it passing below 
the normative threshold.35 However, simultaneously at t2, a witch on a 
34 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 28.
35 It is not important to the threshold account whether nonbeing requires normative failure 
according to one or to many norms. The important thing is that the threshold theorist 
thinks that normative failure alone can make the metaphysical difference. Threshold de-
fenders might claim that the connection between badness and existence is vague, making 
the threshold vague too. This should not affect the argument. So long as the metaphysical 
difference is only a matter of normative failure, a case can still be produced by finding some 
extreme amount of defect that would be sufficient to surpass the vague threshold. For the 
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conveniently timed walk notices the house’s condition. Fearing the worst, 
she casts a spell causing a strong wind to blow in just the way necessary to 
keep the house standing.36 Unlike unsupported structures, which would 
collapse in the house’s condition at t2, the Very Bad House has been phys-
ically preserved.
In order to maintain the identification of the real and the good, the Threshold 
Constitutivist seems committed to admitting that houses can cease to be real 
without being physically destroyed. However, it is the connection between 
physical destruction and reality in the case of artifacts that makes them such 
compelling examples. To maintain the intuitive force of these cases, the Thresh-
old Constitutivist needs to account for some property that could explain how, 
contrary to the description in the example, the Very Bad House remains min-
imally good at t2 when the wind prevents it from falling. However, I will show 
that there are no plausibly good-making properties that will ensure the Very Bad 
House will remain standing at t2.
At t2 the Very Bad House gains the property of being held up by a strong 
wind.37 This new property does not seem to be a property that makes a house 
better qua house.38 More plausibly, the Threshold Constitutivist will think that 
being held up by the wind preserves some other property of the Very Bad House 
between t1 and t2 that keeps it from becoming worse. Their task is then to show 
that there is some property of the Very Bad House that (a) the house has at t1, 
(b) is maintained by the wind at t2, and (c) is good-making at t2. Moreover, in 
order to preserve the connection between nonbeing and physical destruction, 
it must (d) be a property that, if lost, would constitute the Very Bad House’s 
physical destruction.
Three properties might meet these conditions: being standing, stability, and 
having the ability to shelter. The property most obviously suited to (d) is being 
standing. Being standing is clearly related to physical persistence. It is also clearly 
a property that the wind preserves between t1 and t2. However, it is too closely 
related to physical persistence for it to be good-making for houses. Because the 
connection between defect and nonbeing is a physical matter in the case of ar-
case at hand, all that matters is that the difference between the house at t1 and t2 can be 
explained in terms of normative satisfaction.
36 Or if you prefer, a very quick builder on a similar walk erects temporary scaffolding, finishing 
precisely at t2.
37 The Threshold Constitutivist might also think that the house has the property of being be-
witched, but the weather is bewitched, not the house.
38 To see this, consider that for a property p to be a good making property for Ks, it must be 
that if having p makes X a better K, for any other K, Y, it must make Y a better K.
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tifacts, remaining standing is a minimal condition on being a house at all. But if 
it were a norm of houses that they were standing, it would be a consequence of 
something being a house that it satisfied this norm; i.e., it would run afoul of Vi-
olability. So, the fact that the Very Bad House remains standing cannot account 
for it remaining minimally good at t2.39
Though remaining standing cannot itself be good-making, it could be that, 
in addition to remaining standing, the wind keeps the Very Bad House stable 
at t2. Unlike remaining standing, stability seems gradable, avoiding an imme-
diate source of conflict with Violability. Even better, stability seems plausibly 
good-making for houses. However, it is not clear that the house at t2 does have a 
relevantly good-making property of stability.
Stability is a dispositional property whose manifestation response is stand-
ing. Though the manifestation response cannot be good-making, the disposition 
itself seems to be. Problematically, however, stability is an unusual disposition, 
because its manifestation response is not change but stasis.40 Fragility is the dis-
position, say, to break when struck—that is, to undergo a certain change under 
certain stimulus conditions. But stability is a disposition to maintain orientation 
or structural form given environmental changes—that is, to maintain properties 
under certain stimulus conditions. Given this and the connection between real-
ity and the manifestation response of this disposition, it is harder to account for 
how it could be a good-making property the Very Bad House has at t2.
To see why, consider a distinction made by Vetter, who notes that possessing 
some dispositions (threshold dispositions) requires having the manifestation 
response in some proportion of cases, while possessing other dispositions (per-
missive dispositions) only requires having the manifestation response in a single 
case.41 Breakability is a permissive disposition; in order to be breakable, there 
need only be one condition in which an object would break. Fragility is a thresh-
old disposition; in order to be fragile, an object must be easily breakable—there 
must be some sufficiently large number of cases in which it would break. So, we 
can ask, is stability a threshold disposition, like fragility, or a permissive disposi-
tion, like breakability?
One way to easily guarantee that the Very Bad House has dispositional stabil-
ity maintained between t1 and t2 is to understand it as a permissive disposition, 
always had by things that are standing. In keeping the house standing, the wind 
39 We might also put the point this way: remaining standing in this case is a binary property 
that is a criterial condition on kind-membership. It is bound to be ruled out on grounds 
discussed in section 1 above.
40 See Williams, “Static and Dynamic Dispositions.”
41 Vetter, “Dispositions without Conditionals,” 144.
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preserves the permissive disposition of stability. However, given the connection 
between physical persistence and reality, all houses are standing and thus all 
houses are dispositionally stable. So permissive stability runs afoul of Violability 
like being standing does.
On the other hand, stability could be a threshold disposition. Then there will 
be some conditions in which objects have the manifestation response of stability 
(remain standing) without having the disposition (stability). This would allow 
there to be non-stable houses, which resolves the problem with Violability. Un-
fortunately, understanding the relevant sense of stability as threshold stability 
undermines the plausibility that stability is preserved by the wind at t2. If there 
are any cases in which a standing house does not have the threshold disposition 
of stability, the Very Bad House at t2 would be one. In fact, the example of the 
Very Bad House is designed so that it describes an instance of a standing thing 
that lacks the threshold disposition of stability. Either way of understanding 
dispositional stability seems unable to serve the Threshold Constitutivist’s pur-
poses of being a property that is both good-making and preserved by the wind 
between t1 and t2.
The final potentially preserved property of the house, the ability to shelter, 
does no better than remaining standing or stability. Whatever this sheltering 
ability is, if it is to be a good-making property of houses, it cannot be a feature 
had by any standing house. So there must be some ways of preserving the phys-
ical structure of a house while not preserving the good-making ability to shelter. 
That, by hypothesis, is what is being done by the wind at t2. Of course, there 
might some ability to shelter that all non-destroyed houses possess, but this 
cannot be a good-making ability. The issue here, as with the other properties, is 
that defect cannot shade into destruction by shading into physical destruction. 
If Violability is true and being non-destroyed is a requirement on the real, then 
no property that is had by all non-destroyed K-members can be good-making 
for Ks.
The Threshold Constitutivist must instead accept that, despite the fact that 
it is not physically destroyed, the Very Bad House is not a house at t2. There 
could be some explanation of the kind House that would make this counterin-
tuitive result more palatable. Regardless of whether such an explanation can be 
provided, the issue remains that the appeal to physical artifacts to support the 
identification of the real and the good is misguided. Appeals to cases of physical 
artifacts, like houses, exploit the fact that defect can lead to physical destruc-
tion in a mistaken attempt to illustrate that defect can itself constitute nonbeing. 
But defect does not entail physical destruction, so if defect does entail nonbeing, 
rather than being the most plausible illustrations of the Threshold Commitment, 
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physical artifacts actually serve as rather counterintuitive cases for proponents 
to explain.
5. The Cost of Normative Anemia
In the case of Houses, Threshold Constitutivists hoped that the metaphysical sig-
nificance of destruction and the relation of defect and destruction could make the 
Threshold Commitment plausible. But we have seen that preserving the Thresh-
old Commitment requires normative failure itself, and not the destruction that 
it often leads to, to make the metaphysical difference. In the case of Houses, this 
comes at the cost of accommodating some counterintuitive results. In the case 
of Spouses, it comes at the cost of restricting the explanatory scope of Thresh-
old Constitutivists’ explanatory project. But it comes with another cost: giving 
norms this metaphysical significance undermines their other normative roles.
For the Threshold Constitutivist, normative standards are not merely the 
basis for normative evaluation; they also determine the criterial conditions for 
kind-membership. As Korsgaard puts it, an “object to which they apply can fail 
to meet them, at least to some extent, and is subject to criticism if it does not.”42 
This distinguishes threshold constitutivism from other constitutivist accounts 
that locate the metaphysical criteria of kind-membership elsewhere. The Thresh-
old Constitutivist thereby holds that there are some events that constitute both 
a violation of a K-norm by some K-member, x, and the loss of K-membership by 
x, and the violation constitutes rather than causes or precipitates the kind-loss.
Constitutivists generally share a commitment to a fundamental role for 
kind-determined norms in evaluation. According to constitutivists, constitutive-
ly understood norms come from the nature of the thing they govern.43 They thus 
yield a special sort of internal evaluation that is distinguished from evaluation 
according to some external purpose. Because of this, constitutively understood 
norms generate kind-dependent assessments that permit us to, e.g., distinguish 
the standards that make something good or bad qua house from those that make 
it good or bad qua thing in the neighborhood, status symbol, or instance of 
modern architecture.44 Constitutively understood norms are thus kind-specific 
42 Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, 8.
43 For a discussion of goodness-fixing kinds and kind-defect/virtue, see Thomson, Normativity.
44 For example, Korsgaard distinguishes between being a good or bad house in what she calls 
“the strict sense” and being a house that happens to be a good or bad thing “for some external 
reason.” The first strict sense is determined by “constitutive standards,” “standards that ap-
ply to a thing simply in virtue of its being the kind of thing that it is.” What Korsgaard calls 
“constitutive standards,” I am here calling norms. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 28.
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norms that are tied to a particular and important kind of normative status: being 
good or bad qua kind-member. There are two aspects of this evaluative role of 
norms: first, that defect and virtues are kind-dependent and second, that norm 
violation and satisfaction by kind-members have kind-relative evaluative conse-
quences.
A noteworthy consequence of the Threshold Commitment is that norm vi-
olation of kind-members does not always lead to kind-relative evaluative con-
sequences. The Threshold Constitutivist denies that for any K-member, x, gov-
erned by a K-norm, N, x would be defective if x violated N. They must, because 
on their account there will be some x’s that, when they violate N, do not be-
come a worse K, but become a non-K. Of course, constitutive norms pick out 
good- and bad-making features of kind-members, given the nature of the kind in 
question.45 If you satisfy a K-norm and you are a K-member, then the property 
you have that constitutes your satisfaction of the K-norm is good-making. But 
more than this, according to constitutivists, K-norms have particular force for 
K-members that they lack for non-K-members. This is how Korsgaard claims 
constitutivists can answer skeptical challenges with ease.46 When asking why we 
ought to care about the norms that govern us, the fact that we are at risk of fall-
ing apart if we become bad enough is supposed to show that those norms have 
authoritative force for us; we cannot help but care about them.
But the general normative force of norms cannot turn on the kind-mem-
bers in question caring about the risk of nonexistence. Norms cannot, in gen-
eral, have force for kind-members they govern because the kind-members care 
about something else that satisfying the norms is essential for (how, for exam-
ple, would that account for the force of house norms; houses care for nothing). 
Norms must have force because of their connection to their kinds, and that is 
what the constitutive connection is supposed to provide. Somehow the fact that 
sufficient defect is existentially risky is supposed to give norms their force. On 
the contrary, however, this existential risk seems to undermine the account of 
their force. If a particular house being a house turns on its being waterproof, if it 
were at risk of becoming a non-house by becoming leakier, it is hard to see how 
the demand to be waterproof itself could then have any normative force. The 
demand loses its normative bite as soon as it is violated.
45 See, for example, Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 33, in which she argues that we need constitu-
tive standards because of the importance of the normative concept of defect.
46 “Because it does not make sense to ask whether a house should serve as a shelter, it also does 
not make sense to ask if the corners should be sealed and the roof should be waterproof and 
tight . . . there is no further room for doubting that the constitutive standard has normative 
force. For if you fall too far short of the constitutive standard, what you produce will simply 
not be a house.” Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, 29.
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At these thresholds, we can see the weakness, the anemia, of the metaphysical 
account. Taking minimal normative satisfaction to be criterial for kind-member-
ship makes that kind-membership unsuited to explain the force of those norms. 
The force of norms for some individual cannot be explained by the fact that they 
are currently satisfying some subset of them. At the limit case, this would mean 
that a norm has force because it is being satisfied. This account does not give 
internal standards any greater authority than the external standards that consti-
tutivists want to distinguish constitutively understood standards from. Taking 
normative standards to be both criterial and normative undermines the explana-
tion of their normative force. Not only does the Threshold Commitment come 
with explanatory costs related to scope and intuitive persistence conditions, it 
also seems to block central explanations of features like normative force.
6. Constitutive Aims Do Not Avoid Thresholds
Above, I argued that the Threshold Commitment is a flawed account of a 
constraint on norm-governed kind-membership. Constitutivists should thus 
recognize a need for reconsideration of the metaphysical basis of constitutiv-
ist explanations.47 However, though many constitutivists like Katsafanas and 
Korsgaard explicitly endorse something like the Threshold Commitment and 
it seems implied in other accounts, some constitutivist accounts that explain 
constitutive features in terms of constitutive aims might already seem to have 
resources to avoid the Threshold Commitment. To take a brief example, if truth 
is the constitutive aim of belief, this aim might be used to explain the norms 
governing beliefs, though no particular belief must be even minimally true to 
account for it having the constitutive aim. Because having a constitutive aim is 
neither good-making nor scalar, constitutive-aim accounts might already avoid 
the Threshold Commitment, making further development unnecessary. Despite 
this appeal, constitutive aims are no more suited than other constitutive proper-
ties to avoid the Threshold Commitment, or so I argue in this section.
Constitutive aims will be suitable for this purpose if the account of how 
kind-members have the aim both avoids requiring minimal kind-goodness 
and also provides the metaphysical grounds for normative explanations. I first 
consider whether it is possible to give an account of aiming that any action 
(or—more broadly—any norm-governed kind) could be understood as having. 
Then I discuss two views that provide explanations of how kind-members have 
constitutive aims: Velleman’s view that self-knowledge is the constitutive aim 
of action and Wedgwood’s view that truth is the constitutive aim of belief. Nei-
47 Thanks to an anonymous referee for highlighting the need for the discussion in this section.
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ther account, I argue, provides a metaphysical account that avoids the Threshold 
Commitment while providing the resources to ground normative explanations. 
I conclude that these failures show that having a constitutive aim is not going to 
provide a satisfactory way to avoid the Threshold Commitment.
Let us start with a commonly discussed example: one might hold that it is 
constitutive of playing chess to have the aim of checkmating your opponent, 
though one of course need not minimally succeed at checkmating an opponent, 
whatever that might be, or be minimally good according to the rules of chess. 
A constitutivist account of the norms of chess that appealed to this aim would 
need an explanation of what metaphysical property (or properties) constitutes 
having this aim. If such an explanation could be given without identifying hav-
ing the aim with minimal normative properties, and this explanation could then 
be used to explain chess norms, it would be a successful constitutivist account 
that avoided thresholds.48 I think constitutive aims are unlikely to be accounted 
for by properties that could play this role for constitutivists.49
In the case of chess playing, the most straightforward way to account for 
having its constitutive aim might be by appeal to the intentions of the player. 
Whatever metaphysical account we might give of intending to checkmate might 
be used to account for having the aim of checkmating. Putting aside the fact 
that the metaphysics of intentions are controversial, accounting for constitutive 
aims by appeal to intentions is unlikely to work for constitutivist accounts of the 
norms of action generally because it is does not generalize to the central case 
of agency. If the constitutive aim of agency requires having an intention, which 
only agents can have, this introduces problematic bootstrapping: the source of 
the constitutive feature is the very thing constituted by that feature. The ability 
to have the constitutive aim seems to presuppose already having it.50
Velleman recognizes this bootstrapping problem and attempts to avoid it by 
locating the source of the constitutive aim of action subagentially. In what fol-
lows, I explain how Velleman’s account of the constitutive aim of action does 
implicitly rely on the Threshold Commitment. On his account, the constitutive 
aim of action is self-knowledge, but an action gets this aim not from an agential 
intention, but from the agent’s subagential desire to know what she is doing. The 
48 Importantly, I think there can be successful threshold-free constitutivist accounts. My goal 
here is only to show that constitutive-aim accounts are not the place to look for them.
49 Chess is perhaps not as good a case as constitutivists sometimes assume. It seems unlikely 
that we will be able to explain the norms of chess by appeal to the aim of chess, regardless 
of whether we can identify a property that constitutes having the aim of checkmating; see 
Dreier, “When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?”
50 See, for instance, Arruda, “Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.”
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intellect has the aim of knowledge, and a special case of that aim is self-knowl-
edge. Importantly, in acting, we have access to non-observational self-knowl-
edge of what we are up to. What distinguishes action from mere behavior, then, 
is that in acting we make ourselves the authors of our actions. In order to do 
this, the intellect takes the self as a subject, and so the constitutive aim of action 
is “the aim of our intellects as focused on ourselves, the aim to which practical 
knowledge is the obvious shortcut, the aim of knowing what we are doing.”51 
To explain this, Velleman considers a case of mere behavior: Freud’s account of 
knocking over an inkstand and realizing, after the fact, that he knocked it off his 
desk because he desired a new one, and, believing his sister would buy him one 
as a present, he wished to make room for it. Velleman writes that in order for 
the mere behavior to have counted as an action Freud “would need to have been 
actuated not only by the desire and belief mentioned in the story but also by the 
story itself, serving as his grasp of what he was doing—or, in other words, as his 
rationale.”52 So, roughly: the behavior lacked the constitutive aim of action be-
cause the behavior was not motivated by a rationale, something that would have 
provided practical knowledge when acted on.
This role for the rationale introduces thresholds into the account of how sub-
agential desires constitute aims. To constitute action, the desire cannot be mere-
ly lurking subconsciously; it has to manifest itself in the sort of grasp we have 
on what we are up to when we act. In order to act, Velleman believes an agent 
“would need, first, to have been inhibited from acting on his desire and belief 
until he knew what he was up to; and then guided to act on them once he had 
adopted this story. He would then have acted autonomously because he would 
have acted for a reason, having been actuated in part by a rationale.”53 So, it is 
essential for action, on Velleman’s constitutive-aiming account, that one must 
first know what one is up to (or, perhaps, what one will be up to), and then, as 
behavior is guided by that account as a rationale, one thereby acts for reasons 
provided by that rationale. The reasons that one has to do something are “con-
siderations in light of which, in doing it, the subject would know what he was do-
ing.”54 Behavior thus constitutes action when that behavior is guided by reasons, 
understood as considerations that provide self-knowledge. 
But rationales—explanations of what we are up to—can be better or worse 
at providing self-knowledge. The less self-knowledge they provide, the worse 
they are as rationales. As Velleman writes, “when an agent selects rationales that 
51 Velleman, “Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason,” 236.
52 Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, 29.
53 Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, 8.
54 Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, 26.
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are incongruous with who they are, they . . . might have wondered ‘what am I 
doing?’ That is, they might have been puzzled as to how a person like them, with 
a makeup like theirs, would come to act on such motives; and so they wouldn’t 
really or fully have known what they were up to.”55 So not all rationales help 
us accomplish our aim of self-knowledge equally well. Still, on Velleman’s view, 
in order to count as having the constitutive aim of self-knowledge, you already 
have to partially know what you are up to, i.e., you have to already have some 
self-knowledge that permits you to know what you are doing. Thus, for Velleman, 
having a constitutive aim requires minimally satisfying that aim. So, constitutive 
aiming, at least on Velleman’s view, does not avoid the Threshold Commitment 
at all.
Aims relying on agent intentions do not seem suited to the constitutivist ex-
planatory project, and Velleman’s constitutive account relying on subagential 
aims involves a commitment to Thresholds. One further way we might under-
stand constitutive aims is suggested by discussions of the aims of mental states. 
For example, many philosophers endorse claims of the form “the constitutive 
aim of belief is truth,” or “belief aims at truth.” But these claims are not taken to 
be in conflict with the possibility of false belief, and they do not seem to think 
that beliefs have this aim because believers intentionally aim at truth. Perhaps, 
then, these accounts will be constitutive-aim accounts that already avoid the 
Threshold Commitment.
Ralph Wedgwood is one prominent defender of the claim that truth is the 
constitutive aim of belief. Wedgwood explains that when we say belief has the 
constitutive aim of truth we are not attributing some metaphysical property to 
all beliefs that accounts for this aim; rather, he endorses a view he calls Norma-
tivism, according to which belief is the attitude constituted by having truth as 
its correctness condition.56 Similarly we might think that chess has the aim of 
checkmate in the sense that chess is the game constituted by having checkmate 
as its success condition. Just as you can actively attempt to believe false things, 
you can play chess without caring about checkmate or actively throw a game. 
Maybe you could also act without self-constituting or having self-knowledge.57 
So, according to Normativism, aims are constitutive of some kind when individ-
55 Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, 29.
56 See especially Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity.
57 This is also, plausibly, a more charitable understanding of attributions of constitutive aims, 
because aiming in the literal sense requires knowing beforehand what you are aiming to get, 
but believers do not first determine what is true and then attempt to believe it, in the way 
that archers first locate a target and then try to hit it. See Dreier, “When Do Goals Explain 
the Norms that Advance Them?” 159–60, for this point.
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uals are members of that kind in virtue of having that aim as their correctness 
condition.
Normativism explains what it is for an aim to be constitutive of some kind, 
but it explains kinds by shared norm-assessability (or shared-correctness condi-
tions), not by shared properties that are used to explain their shared norms. So, 
Normativism does not require any minimal normative satisfaction for constitu-
tive aims and thus avoids the Threshold Commitment. However, it does this by 
not undertaking the kind of constitutivist explanation we started by motivating: 
it does not seek to explain the normative features of kinds by appeal to what 
is constitutive of kind-membership. Instead, it explains what is constitutive of 
kind-membership by appeal to the correctness conditions shared by kind-mem-
bers. I do not think this explanatory work is ruled out for Normativists; the view 
might be paired with a metaphysical account of why kind-members had these 
correctness conditions. But, in this case, the constitutivist explanation of the 
normative features would not be in terms of constitutive aims.
So, constitutive aims do not seem to help current constitutivists avoid the 
Threshold Commitment. Constitutive aims that require intentional aimings run 
into bootstrapping worries, which led Velleman to explain them in terms of sub-
agential desires. These are not threshold free, however, as we saw that having 
behavior rationalized by desire in the way needed for it to have the constitutive 
aim of self-knowledge required minimal self-knowledge. Alternatively, accounts 
that explain constitutive aims as correctness conditions avoid normative thresh-
olds, but do not use aims to provide the sort of constitutive explanation under 
consideration. If the Threshold Commitment is a problem for constitutivism, as 
I argued above, constitutive aims are not a solution for constitutivists.
7. Constitutivism without Normative Thresholds
Though many constitutivists endorse and are committed to the Threshold Com-
mitment, even Threshold Constitutivists do not take it to be an essential feature 
of constitutivist accounts.58 The Threshold Commitment is only one account of 
how norms can be constitutively explained.
58 Some constitutivists have a very narrow view of constitutivism, according to which the only 
views that count as constitutivist are those that take there to be constitutive aims that gen-
erate norms. I suspect that Katsafanas thinks this, given the set-up of his book, in which he 
classifies both Humeans and Aristotelians who appeal to the nature of individuals to explain 
their goodness as non-constitutivists. Both Judith Thomson and Michael Smith, constitu-
tivists on my account (and Smith’s), are classified by Katsafanas as non-constitutivists. Not 
all constitutivists are so restrictive, of course. This restriction is fine; it might be that on 
the narrow use of the term we ought to reject constitutivism on the basis of the arguments 
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There are a few options open to constitutivists for how norms could be ex-
plained in terms of what is constitutive of kind-membership other than making 
those norms or properties that satisfied them constitutive. We might identify 
other features as determining constitutive forms or functions (or even aims). 
Though Korsgaard identifies minimal goodness with form, she also sometimes 
writes as though performing a function is necessary for having that constitutive 
function. At times she seems to endorse what we might call a “function-perfor-
mance” view. For instance, she claims that artifacts must be performing their 
characteristic activity to count as an artifact. Memorably, she writes that a thing 
we call a vacuum cleaner is really just a heap that “when properly incorporated 
by you, makes you into a vacuum cleaner.”59 Not only is your vacuum cleaner not 
really a vacuum cleaner when in the closet, but when you vacuum the floor with 
your heap non-vacuum you become a vacuum cleaner instead of it.
The Threshold Constitutivist requires that the very same properties that 
make one a good K-member are minimally required to be a K-member at all. 
In contrast, a function-performance view holds that minimal performance of 
the characteristic function of Ks is required for K-membership. If by “minimal 
performance” we mean “possession of the properties that permit minimal per-
formance,” or if we take performing a function to be good-making, then this is a 
threshold view, but I take it that it is not always so meant. It can also mean that 
something only has a functional nature when it actually is performing that func-
tion, like the vacuum cleaner is only actually a vacuum cleaner when it is vacu-
uming. If performing the function of vacuuming is what it is to be a vacuum, and 
you think that the user of the machine rather than the machine is performing the 
function, you might be tempted, with Korsgaard, to call the human user, rath-
er than the machine, the vacuum. Distinguishing normative satisfaction from 
functional performance allows us to see two ways we might identify constitutive 
conditions of kind-membership.
Unfortunately, function-performance views are not going to help the con-
stitutivist, because they mis-account for kind-membership and norm-applica-
tion.60 Pace Korsgaard, I am not a vacuum, as evidenced by the fact that I am 
of this paper. At least here, I am using the term in a broader sense. See Katsafanas, Agency 
and the Foundation of Ethics, 30–34. For constitutivists self-identifying outside of the nar-
row use, see e.g., Schafer, “Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1)”; Smith, 
“A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons.” This identification of constitutive aim accounts with 
constitutivism is also implicit in some literature critical of constitutivism; see, e.g., Enoch, 
“Agency, Shmagency.”
59 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 37.
60 For further arguments to this effect, see Lindeman, “Etiological Functions for Constitutiv-
ists.”
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not assessable according to the norms of vacuums. What the Korsgaard-esque 
function-performance view calls a heap is properly speaking my vacuum clean-
er—and I suspect you and the store that sold it to me agree. Things that are not 
performing their functions are still members of functionally understood kinds. 
Additionally, making anything that serves a function a member of a functional 
kind (as Korsgaard implies by calling me the vacuum cleaner when I use it) risks 
erasing the distinction between being badly suited to perform a function and 
being defective. That a piece of aluminum siding is used to saw down a sapling 
does not make it a saw, and that it is poorly suited to the task does not make it 
defective. For constitutivists, kind-membership conditions just cannot involve 
actually performing a function. Constitutivists thus need another account of the 
constitutive features of kind-membership that can be used to explain norms.
In closing, I suggest that constitutivists should turn to proper functions to 
provide this account.61 In the philosophy of biology, a proper function is the kind 
of function that something is taken to have non-accidentally, as a feature of what 
that thing is.62 The question, of course, is how proper functions are constitutive 
of kind-membership or, put another way, what it is in virtue of which any indi-
vidual has a proper function. There are several requirements on such an account: 
it must allow Violability by not entailing that any particular normative standard 
is satisfied, and also not require minimal normative goodness. It must allow for 
stable kind-membership and for explanations of internal normative standards as 
well as kind-relative defect and virtue.
Etiological accounts of proper function—those that appeal to the history 
of individuals and kinds to account for function—are taken to have made te-
leology safe for naturalists in the sciences by linking functions to evolutionarily 
determined kinds.63 Consider the following quote from Millikan as she explains 
61 Proper functions are sometimes contrasted with what are known as systems functions, 
those that give an account of function of some x relative to the causal contribution x plays to 
the broader capacity of a system in which x can be understood as being a part. See Cummins, 
“Functional Analysis,” for discussions of systems functions; see Allen, Bekoff, and Lauder, 
Nature’s Purposes, for an overview of this distinction.
62 Millikan stresses that her coinage of “proper” is meant to mirror its etymological ancestor, 
the Latin proprius, meaning “one’s own”; see Millikan, “Biofunctions,” 116.
63 Though I do not address alternative accounts of function in this chapter, for a nice over-
view of the differences between etiological and propensity accounts of function, see Mitch-
ell, “Dispositions or Etiologies?” For presentations and criticisms of the propensity view 
of functions, according to which the function of an individual or trait depends on how it 
would fare under selection in some specific environment, see e.g., Bigelow and Pargetter, 
“Functions.”
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how the etiological proper function of pumping blood accounts for what it is to 
be a heart:
That a heart is a heart certainly has something to do with pumping blood. 
But what kind of connection with pumping blood must a heart have? 
Some hearts are diseased and some are malformed in such a way that 
they are unable to pump blood. Other devices, such as water pumps, are 
perfectly capable of pumping blood, yet these are not hearts. . . . It is not 
then the actual constitution, powers, or dispositions of a thing that make 
it a member of a certain biological category. My claim will be that it is the 
“proper function” of a thing that puts it in a biological category, and this 
has to do not with its powers, but with its history.64
In addition to threshold accounts and function-performance accounts, the con-
stitutivist also has available to her etiological accounts. The account of the his-
tory or creation of an individual could explain what it is to have a constitutive 
function. Having an etiological proper function neither entails that the individ-
ual is any good at performing the function nor that they actually perform the 
function, and so it is not a threshold or a function-performance view. It could, 
however, account for kind-membership and normative standards governing 
kind-members. Moreover, etiological accounts need not restrict selection ac-
counts to evolutionary selection.65 For example, in the cases of both House and 
Spouse, histories of individuals are relevant to their kind-membership. In deter-
mining whether a person is a spouse, you look to that person’s history. Spous-
es have their kind-status because of historically determinant events: marriages 
or similar social-recognition events. Houses are given the forms they have by 
builders who select those forms because of their connection to performing the 
function of sheltering people in ways suited to primary residences. Houses are 
the things they are (i.e., structures for primary residence) because of their forms 
being selected and designed for that purpose. In both cases, we see the historical 
accounts of individual kind-members as simultaneously explaining their func-
tions and their kind-membership.
The task of fully developing and defending a specific account of proper 
functions congenial to constitutivists is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
64 Millikan, “In Defense of Proper Functions,” 85.
65 In fact, even in biology proper function accounts should not limited to evolutionary selec-
tion. See Garson, “Function, Selection, and Construction in the Brain,” for a fascinating 
discussion of the need for non-evolutionary differential-retention accounts to account for 
proper functions of neural structures, allowing for novel functions unaccountable for on an 
evolutionary scale, like the function of facilitating Tetris play.
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substantive lessons here should be heartening to those interested in developing 
constitutive explanations of norms as well as those who are interested in seeing 
why current constitutive accounts are unsatisfactory. Specifically, norms can-
not play the metaphysical role of criteria for kind-membership that Threshold 
Constitutivists have given them. Constitutivists who give such a criterial role 
to norm satisfaction must restrict the scope of their constitutive explanations, 
are pushed to accept implausible permanence conditions for artifacts, and have 
restricted evaluative consequences of normative failure that block explanations 
of normative force.
Rather than this being a blow to the constitutivist project, this result should 
instead encourage constitutivists to look elsewhere for an account of the con-
stitutivist features of good-making kinds with which to explain their norms. I 
briefly sketched a promising alternative on which functional kind-membership 
is based in historical facts. Etiological proper functions are available to constitu-
tivists seeking an account of the constitutive features of good-making kinds from 
which they can explain norms. Clearly there is work to be done to show that an 
etiological account of proper function could be given for the kinds of interest to 
constitutivists in the practical and theoretical domains. Nonetheless, given the 
dim prospects of the alternatives and the general appeal of constitutivism, con-
stitutivists should welcome the development of a constitutivist account based 




Allen, Colin, Marc Bekoff, and George V. Lauder, eds. Nature’s Purposes: Analyses 
of Function and Design in Biology. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1998.
Arruda, Caroline T. “Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.” 
Philosophia 44, no. 4 (December 2016): 1165–83.
66 This paper has benefitted substantially from discussions and helpful feedback from many, 
many people. Special thanks are due to Sarah Buss, Eric Brown, Bob Brandom, John 
Brunero, Lindsay Crawford, Jamie Dreier, Julia Driver, Meghan Page, Luca Ferrero, Guy 
Fletcher, Kim Frost, Charlie Kurth, Eliot Michaelson, Claire Morrissey, Tyke Nunez, Hille 
Paakunainen, Michael Ridge, Connie Rosati, Lizzie Schecter, Karl Schafer, Mark Schroeder, 
Tim Schroeder, Kieran Setiya, Daniel Singer, Paulina Sliwa, Matthew Smith, Michael Smith, 
Julia Staffel, Daniel Star, Brian Talbot, Michael Thompson, Katia Vavova, Eric Wiland, an 
audience at the Midsummer Philosophy Workshop, and several very helpful referees.
 Constitutivism without Normative Thresholds 257
Barandalla, Ana, and Michael Ridge. “Function and Self-Constitution.” Analysis 
71, no. 2 (April 2011): 364–80.
Bigelow, John, and Robert Pargetter. “Functions.” Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 4 
(April 1987): 181–96. 
Clark, Philip. “Velleman’s Autonomism.” Ethics 111, no. 3 (April 2001): 580–93.
Cummins, Robert C. “Functional Analysis.” Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 20 (No-
vember 1975): 741–65.
Dreier, James. “When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?” Ox-
ford Studies in Metaethics 5 (2010): 153–74.
Enoch, David. “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What 
Is Constitutive of Agency.” Philosophical Review 115, no. 2 (April 2006): 169–98.
———. “Shmagency Revisited.” In New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael 
Brady, 208–33. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Friedman, Michael. “Explanation and Scientific Understanding.” Journal of Phi-
losophy 71, no. 1 ( January 1974): 5–19.
Garson, Justin. “Function, Selection, and Construction in the Brain.” Synthese 
189, no. 3 (December 2012): 451–81.
Katsafanas, Paul. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutiv-
ism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Kitcher, Philip. “Explanatory Unification.” Philosophy of Science 48, no. 4 (De-
cember 1981): 507–31.
———. “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World.” Min-
nesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1989): 410–505.
Korsgaard, Christine M. The Constitution of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008.
———. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009.
Lavin, Douglas. “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error.” Ethics 114, no. 3 
(April 2004): 424–57. 
Lindeman, Kathryn. “An Explanation of Constitutivist Normativity.” Unpub-
lished manuscript.
———. “Etiological Functions for Constitutivists.” Unpublished manuscript.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. “Biofunctions: Two Paradigms.” In Functions: New Essays 
in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, edited by André Ariew, Robert 
Cummins, and Mark Perlman, 113–43. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
———. “In Defense of Proper Functions.” In White Queen Psychology and Other 
Essays for Alice, 13–29. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1993.
Mitchell, Sandra D. “Dispositions or Etiologies? A Comment on Bigelow and 
Pargetter.” Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 5 (May 1993): 249–59.
258 Lindeman
Railton, Peter. “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about 
Belief and Action.” In Ethics and Practical Reason, edited by Garrett Cullity 
and Berys Gaut, 53–79. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
Rosati, Connie S. “Agents and ‘Shmagents.’” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11 
(2016): 182–213.
Schafer, Karl. “Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1): Realism 
and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 10 
(October 2015): 690–701.
Setiya, Kieran. “Akrasia and the Constitution of Agency.” In Practical Knowledge: 
Selected Essays, 253–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
———. “Explaining Action.” Philosophical Review 112, no. 3 (2003): 339–93.
———. Reasons without Rationalism. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2007.
Silverstein, Matthew. “The Shmagency Question.” Philosophical Studies 172, no. 5 
(May 2015): 1127–42.
———. “Teleology and Normativity.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11 (2016): 
214–40.
Smith, Michael. “A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts.” 
Law, Ethics, and Philosophy 1 (2013): 9–30.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Normativity. Chicago: Open Court Press, 2008.
Tiffany, Evan. “Why Be an Agent?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 2 
( June 2012): 223–33.
Velleman, J. David. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000.
———. “Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason.” Philosophical Studies 121, 
no. 3 (December 2004): 225–38.
———. “Replies to Discussion on The Possibility of Practical Reason.” Philosoph-
ical Studies 121, no. 3 (December 2004): 277–98.
Vetter, Barbara. “Dispositions without Conditionals.” Mind 123, no. 489 ( January 
2014): 129–56.
Walden, Kenneth. “Laws of Nature, Laws of Freedom, and the Social Construc-
tion of Normativity.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7 (2012): 37–79.
Wedgwood, Ralph. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007.
Williams, Neil E. “Static and Dynamic Dispositions.” Synthese 146, no. 3 (Sep-
tember 2005): 303–24.
